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 OPINION
         
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Appellant Ronal Murillo is a native and citizen of El Salvador who entered the
United States illegally in 1989.  Murillo obtained Employment Authorization Documents
(“EADs”) covering the period between 1991 and September 2004, but did not have a
valid EAD between April and June 2005, the time period relevant to this case.  Murillo
lived with his girlfriend, Ana Guevara, a native and citizen of El Salvador, who also did
not have a valid EAD during the relevant time period. 
Murillo’s brother, Julio, brokered the purchase of false immigration and
identification documents for customers who paid him to buy them from his sources.  In
May 2005, Murillo discussed with Julio his desire to obtain a Social Security card from
Hector Martinez to replace the card Murillo had lost.  In a court-authorized wiretap
recording of Julio’s telephone conversations, Murillo said he would call Martinez “to see
if he can make me up one . . . [j]ust like the other one.  I also have to get one that I asked
him to do for Ana.”  Supp. App. at 179-80.  When Martinez could not obtain the
3requested card at that time, Julio told Murillo to try to acquire the card from another
source, Alan, whom Murillo “kn[e]w . . . better” than Julio.  Supp. App. at 190.  Although
Murillo could not reach Alan, Julio spoke to Alan’s friend who stated that he could get
him “a pink one” (a permanent resident card) later.  Supp. App. at 211.  
On June 16, 2005, Murillo, his brother Julio, and Martinez were arrested.  Murillo
executed a waiver of his Miranda rights, and told Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) officials that he did not create false documents but knew individuals who did,
including Martinez.  He admitted that he sought a fraudulent Social Security card for
himself, but that he never received it.  Agents also searched Martinez’s apartment and
found a paper cutter, card stock, a laminating machine, a typewriter ribbon, passport
photos, an alien’s resident card, and a Social Security card, all indicia of a project to
create identification cards.  The typewriter ribbon contained 119 different sets of names,
Social Security numbers, and alien numbers, none of which were legitimate.  Murillo’s
name was not included on the ribbon. 
On September 26, 2005, Murillo and his two co-defendants were indicted for
conspiracy to transfer false identification documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028. 
Murillo’s co-defendants entered guilty pleas and cooperated with the authorities.  In
contrast, Murillo proceeded to trial, and testified in his own defense.  The jury found him
guilty.  Murillo was sentenced to thirty-five months imprisonment followed by three years
supervised release.  Murillo has served his prison sentence and thus the only remaining
In any event, Murillo’s claim that the District Court abused1
its discretion in denying his request for an interpreter during his
trial fails because the record suggests that Murillo did not qualify
for an interpreter under the Court Interpreters Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1827.  We also reject his other claims regarding the District Court’s
comment in front of the jury that Murillo had never asked for an
interpreter, and the cross-examination of Murillo in that regard.
We reject Murillo’s claim that during his cross-examination
the prosecutor “testified” at trial by referring to his presence at a
meeting with Murillo and an ICE agent.  The prosecutor phrased
his questions to Murillo impartially, simply making references to
his presence, but neither introduced testimony by the ICE agent to
counter Murillo’s answers nor referred to them in his summation.
We also reject Murillo’s contention that the prosecutor (with
the government’s witness) improperly read parts of the translated
transcripts of the wiretap-recorded conversations to the jury.
“[T]he[ ] reading of the transcripts did not constitute ‘testimony’ in
the sense of ‘evidence given by a competent witness, under oath or
affirmation.’”  United States v. Rengifo, 789 F.2d 975, 983 (1st
Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 
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issue is the length of his supervised release term.
II.
Although in his brief to this court Murillo raised multiple issues on appeal, at oral
argument before us his counsel pressed only the issue relating to Murillo’s sentencing. 
Thus, we will consider the other issues waived.1
Murillo contends that the District Court erred when it enhanced Murillo’s base
offense level on the ground that the offense involved 100 or more fraudulent documents. 
See U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1(b)(2)(C).  The District Court reasoned that Murillo was part of “a
jointly undertaken criminal activity,” and that therefore his offense level was to be
 Although it recognized the inconsistency between the2
enhancement and the Probation Office’s recommendation that
Murillo be afforded a two-level minor role downward adjustment
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), the Court nonetheless adopted
that recommendation based on the fact that Murillo personally only
requested three documents and did not himself create the
fraudulent documents. 
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determined on the basis of “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). 
According to the Probation Office, the evidence at trial showed that the fraudulent
document conspiracy created more than 100 documents, and it recommended that a nine-
level increase to Murillo’s base offense level was warranted because “the scope of the
conspiracy was reasonably foreseeable” to Murillo.  PSR ¶¶ 30, 32.  The District Court
adopted that recommendation.   We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s2
interpretation of a particular Sentencing Guideline and review its factual findings for clear
error.  United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2002).
The commentary to the relevant Sentencing Guideline, § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), explains
that “the scope of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant . . . is not
necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy . . . .”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt.
n.2.  Accordingly, to determine Murillo’s accountability for his co-defendants’ conduct,
“the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant
agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced
by the defendant’s agreement).”  Id.; see also United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 991-
692 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that relevant conduct provision is concerned with scope of
defendant’s agreed-upon involvement in a conspiracy, not scope of conspiracy itself). 
Murillo argues that the record only showed that he tried to procure three fraudulent
documents for himself and his girlfriend, Ana Guevara, and that he should therefore not be
held responsible for the 119 sets of names found on Martinez’s typewriter ribbon.  The
District Court rejected Murillo’s argument that he was just a purchaser, finding that the
evidence at trial showed Murillo “knew what was going on,” and knew before the
evidence was seized from Martinez’s apartment that his brother, Martinez, and Alan were
in the business of creating fraudulent identification documents.  Supp. App. at 715.  We
cannot agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Murillo was more than a purchaser
because there is no evidence that Murillo brought in other customers or acted as a broker
for anyone other than himself and his girlfriend.  The District Court improperly “focus[ed]
on the scope of the conspiracy as a whole, rather than on the scope of [Murillo’s]
undertaking and involvement as required.”  United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 254 (3d
Cir. 1998).
We agree with Murillo that the evidence shows only that he agreed to obtain three
fraudulent documents for himself and his girlfriend.  The fact that Murillo may have had
knowledge of his co-defendants’ criminal activity is not alone sufficient to establish the
extent of the scope of criminal activity to which he agreed.  See United States v. North,
900 F.2d 131, 133-34 (8th Cir. 1990), cited with approval in Collado, 975 F.2d at 994
7(stating that “North was correctly decided because even though North was aware of
Murphy’s [drug] dealings with others, those dealings were outside the scope of the activity
North agreed to undertake with Murphy”); see also United States v. Marquez, 48 F.3d 243,
246 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[R]easonable foreseeability means more than subjective awareness
on the part of the individual defendants. . . .  Instead, conduct of co-conspirators . . . can be
considered reasonably foreseeable to a particular defendant if that defendant has
demonstrated a substantial degree of commitment to the conspiracy’s objectives, either
through his words or his conduct.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Because the evidence demonstrates that Murillo’s involvement in his co-defendants’
fraudulent document business was limited to the three documents to be obtained for him
personally, the District Court should not have considered the 119 sets of names found on
Martinez’s typewriter ribbon in the calculation of Murillo’s sentence.
III.
For the above-stated reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment of
sentence and remand to the Court for resentencing on Murillo’s term of supervised release
consistent with this opinion.
